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SURFACE WATER IN CITIES
INCREASING
THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES ON PERMITTING, DIVERTING,
FLOW
NATURAL
AND OBSTRUCTING THE

Difference Between the Rules as to City and Rural Land
all
T is evident that no one hard and fast rule could be applied to
and
injustice
producing
Icases, either in city or country, "without
impolitic results. The needs and conditions in city and country are
.different. They usually differ widely in different parts of the same
of New
city. These considerations have induced the Supreme Court
this
determining
"In
Hampshire to adopt the flexible rule, that:
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course,
of
would,
case
question all the circumstances of the
the
of
importance
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nature
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considered; and among them
improvements sought to be made, the extent of the interference
with the water, and the amount of injury done to other land owners
as compared with the value of such improvements, and also whether
such injury could or could not have been reasonably foreseen."'
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in deciding
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37 So. 586, holding defendants not liable
v. Baker (1883), 75 Ala. 94, 5z
and saying the rule is inapplicable in cities; Crabtree
56 Am. Rep. 24; Freeburg v. DavenAm. Rep. 424; Farris v. Dudley 0884), 78 Ala. x26,
the city not liable for water running
port (1884), 63 Iowa 1xg, 18 N. W. 7o5, holding
that the rules as to city and rural
from the street onto lots below grade, and intimating
71 N. H. 86, i8q, 5 Atl. 95!, S8
property are different; Franklin v. Durgee (90!),
Y. 34', 346.
L. R. A. x2; Vanderwiele v. Taylor (x875), 65 N.
court said: "It is urged, howIn Gormley v. Sanford (1869), 52 Ill. 158, 162, the
lands, should not be applied
ever, that this rule, even if justly applicable to agricultural
sewerage of which property
to city lots. Where a city has established an artificial
hold that it was their duty
owners can reasonably avail themselves, we should probably
in the present case. But this was
to do so, and so the court substantially instructed
not the state of facts in reference to this property."
Rep. 831.
'Boyd v. Conklin (1884), 54 Mich. 583, 2o N. W. 595, 52 Am.
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other citations, were cases where the lands were in towns and cities,
and the erections or acts in litigation referred to the uses of that
class of property. And in relying on these it was claimed that there
was no substantial foundation for any distinction between urban
and rural property. There is no question but that such a distinction
is recognized in the civil law authorities referred to in the argument,
as well as in several of the cases cited. The distinction is one of
"substance
and not arbitrary. As already suggested, the adjoining
owners owe mutual duties,--the one to receive the natural flow, and
the other not to materially change its conditions. It is obvious that
the laying out of town streets and the multiplication of buildings
cannot avoid making serious changes in the surface of the ground
and in the condition of surface water. Grades must usually be
established for streets and sidewalks and pavements, and other
surface changes are usual in addition to the walls of buildings,
which, with their embankments, must obstruct or change the drainage. It is almost universally expected and provided that se 'verage
and drainage shall be regulated by some municipal standard. There
cannot be towns without changing the face of the land materially."
In one old Pennsylvania case, Bentz v. Arnistrorsg (i844),4 an
action by the owner of the upper part of a city lot against the
lower for damages from water set back by an embankment built by
the lower proprietor merely to stop the water, was held not maintainable. The court said: "In the argument, something was said about
the natural formation of the surface of the ground of the two lots,
and that, according to it, the water as it fell in rain was naturally
inclined to run off from the lot of the plaintiff onto that of the
defendant below, and the latter was therefore bound to submit to it.
This, however, I take to be a non sequitur; for in the purchase of
lots of ground laid out and sold for the purpose of building up towns
and cities thereon, it has ever been understood, and such has been
the practice and usage too, that the natural formation of 'the surface
will, and indeed must, necessarily undergo a change in the construction of the buildings and other improvements that are designed and
intended to be made. In doing this it would seem to be right that
the common benefit and convenience of the respective owners of
adjoining lots should be consulted and attended to; but certainly no
one ought to be restrained- from improving his lot in such a manner
as to make it answer the purpose for which it was laid out, sold and
purchased, if practicable without overreaching upon his neighbor's
lot. He ought to be permitted to form and regulate the surface of
'Bentz v. Armstrong (1844), 8 Watts & S. 40, 42 Am. Dec. 265; approved in MeMahon v. Thornton (1897), 5 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 503.
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it as he pleases, either by excavation or filling up, as may be requisite
to the convenient enjoyment of it; taking care, however, not to
produce any detriment or injury to his neighbor in the occupation
or enjoyment of his adjoining lot. It is of great importance that the
water upon each lot, arising from rain or other cause, should be
conducted by the owner or occupier thereof, if he wishes to have-it
removed, directly from it to a sewer or other place appropriated for
the receipt and discharge of the same, and not to be turned or led
onto an adjoining lot without the consent of the owner; and it
appears to me to be the duty of the owner of each lot, if he improves
it, to do it in such a way, if practicable, as to lead and conduct the
water which happens to fall or be on it, off in the way just
mentioned, without regard to the original formation of the surface
of his lot." But in a later case the same court affirmed a judgment
for damages in favor of the owner of an outlying lot in Allegheny
against the owner of a lower tract for flooding plaintiff's land by
building a dam to protect defendant's land from water naturally
flowing from plaintiff's lot and elsewhere, though increased by
ditches. 5
6
Mr. Washburn, writing on Easements in 1863, said that it would
the upper to the lower
from
drainage
seem that the natural right of
land in cities, and this
to
application
no
had
land, where recognized,
and courts since. 7
writers
several
by
reiterated
been
has
declaration
There is little or nothing to justify the statement. Wherever the
civil law rule has been recognized, the right of surface drainage has
been recognized, in the cities as much as in the country, due allowance being made for change of circumstances; and in states claiming
to follow the so-called common law rule, so far as they have admitted
a right to drainage of surface water at all, as in ravines, the right
has been protected as to city property as much as in its application
to rural land. The only authority cited by Mr. Washburn to support
his statement was Bentz v. Armstrong, quoted above ;5 and yet before
application
his book was published the existence of the right and its
9
to city property had been recognized by several courts. The Court
Martin v. Riddle (xs86), 26 Pa. St. 415.
Ch. III, p. 356.
7 Hall v. Rising (19o5), 141 Ala. 431, 37 So. 586; Lampe v. San Francisco (1899),
124 Cal. 546, 57 Pac. 461; Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles (1894), 103 Cal.
461, 37 Pac. 375, in which the city was held not liable for making a culvert under a
street too small, because the damage resulted from an extraordinary flood; and yet it
was said by the court that since the water flowed in a natural depression or valley the
city would have been liable if it had not made such provision as it could anticipate need
of.
3 Ante p. 449.
9Laurnier v. Francis (18s6), 23 Mo. ix~; Amick v. Tharp (1856), 13 Grat. (Va.)
564, 67 Am. Dec. 787.
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of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, speaking of the subject in
1856, said: "It is insisted that the law, as to running water, does
not apply to building lots in a city or large towns. I cannot see why
it does not," etc.10 Where it has been held that the owner of a lot
in town may obstruct or divert the natural flow of surface water
with impunity, the same is held with regard to drainage of rural
land.11
The Massachusetts or So-Called Common Law Rule
The whole law of surface water rights has been embarrassed by
calling the doctrine that there is no right of drainage for surface
waters outside of grant or prescription the common law rule. Many
persons, including several eminent courts, have been misled thereby
into supposing that such was the common law in England. That
such was not the common law of England, and that the notion
originated so near at hand as in the state of Massachusetts in the
20Earl v. DeHart (86), 12 N. J. Eq. (x Bess.) 280, 72 Am. Dec. 395.
gives no

1 'That diverting or obstructing the flow of surface-water in the country
cause for action was held in the following cases:
Indiana: Cairo & V. Ry. Co. v. Stevens (188x), 73 Ind. 278, 38 Am. Rep. 139,
denying damages for land flooded by railway roadbed stopping natural flow; Benthall v.
Seifert (188), 77 Ind. 302, reversing judgment for plaintiff for damages for damming
up a ravine through which surface water had always flowed.
Kansas: Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Keys (1895), 55 Kan. 205, 218, 40 Pac. 275, 49 Am.
St. Rep. 249, embankment built by railway company to protect itself from surface water.
held not to give cause for action to one on whose land the water was restrained.
68 Me. 521, in which an action of case for
Maine: Murphy v. Kelley (878),
obstructing the sewer draining plaintiff's cellar was held not maintainable; on the
ground that, though used 13 years, no right by grant or prescription was shown; and
defendant may erect structures on his own land to prevent surface water flowing from
any other land onto his regardless of how it may affect others.
Massachusetts: Bates v. Smith (x868), iao Mass. x8x, affirming judgment against
the members of the parish committee for damages for entering plaintiff's land and
breaking an embankment erected by him at the upper line of his land to prevent water
flowing from a valley through defendant's cemetery onto his land, though the embankment
had raised the water in the cemetery so high it was about to flow into several tombs in
which dead bodies were awaiting burial; Franklin v. Fisk (z866), 95 Mass. 211, 90 Am.
Dec. 194, denying injunction at the suit of the town to restrain defendant from maintaining a dam on his land to prevent surface water flowing onto it from the road and
through a culvert recently made by the public authorities to drain the highway onto his
land; Cassidy v. Old Colony R. Co, (x886), 141 Mass. 174, 5 N. E. 142, denying
damages for water set back by defendant's roadbed onto plaintiff's land.
New York: Moyer v. N. Y. Cent. & Hud. Ry. Co. (x882), 88 N. Y. 351, 356.
Texas: Barnett v. Matagorda R. & 1. Co. (904), 98 Texas 355, 83 S. W.. 801,
holding an irrigation company not liable for water set back by the dikes along its canal.
Washington: Cass v. Dicks (1896), x4 Wash. 75, 44 Pac. 113, 53 Am. St. Rep.
859, overflow of Skagit river.
Wisconsin: Lessard v. Strain (i885), 62 Wis. x1, 22 N. W. 284, 5x Am. Rep.
715, 2o Cent. Law J. 23!, holding defendant not liable for diverting surface water onto
plaintiff's land by building an embankment to prevent it coming onto defendant's farm;
Borchsenius v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (1897), 96 Wis. 448, 71 N. WV.884.
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12
year A. D. 1857, in the case of Parks v. Newburyport, seems pretty
clear.
The decisions on the question of surface water rights in England
are not'numerous, because the early establishment of their drainage
commission prevented such questions getting into court. The following cases are given as indicating the attitude of the English
judges, to show that the so-called common law doctrine is opposed
to the views expressed whenever the question came before an English
court. The earliest case found in the effort to trace the history of
the English law came before the English King's Bench in the year
A. D. I344. A man brought a writ of nuisance in respect of a house
erected to the nuisance of his freehold, and counted that, whereas he
had his house and below his house a piece of ground containing so
much in length and so much in breadth, by which the water was
wont to flow down from his house, and discharge, etc., the defendant'had erected a house adjoining his house and higher, so that the
water and the drops of rain could not flow down as they were wont
to do, but fell upon the walls of his house, by reason whereof the
timber of his house rotted, etc.. Exception to the count for nonpursuance was held not well taken: Though of his own wrong the
defendant was granted the view. The final disposition of the case
is not given, but it seems taken for granted on all hands that to set
13
back the water would be an actionable wrong.
In the year A. D. 1338, J. was attached to answer W. in a plea
wherefore upon his wall at E., near a certain house of the said W.
there, he placed stones of such width that the rain falling on these
stones comes down on the said house so that the walls and timbers
of the said house have become decayed and rotten, etc. But what
was thought of the case does not appear further than that the
1
defendant joined issue. The decision is not stated. "
In the year A. D. 1468, in a case in which the main question was
how one should plead a prescription for an easement, it was said by
DANBY, J., "If water runs over the land of M., and M. stops the
water in its course so that it floods my land, I may well abate the
an action, for stopping the
dam, and for my entry he
15 shall not have
water was his own. act."
In the year A. D. 1521, on trespass qmlr'e clausum by Sir Simon
Harcourt against one Spicer, the defendant pleaded in justification
of the alleged trespass that the place, etc., contained twenty acres of
76 Mass.
lUYearbook
14Yearbooks
15Yearbook,

(zo Gray)
(Pike), z8
(Pike), xx
8 Ed. IV.,

8.
Edw. III., p. 210.
& 12, Edw. I., p. 468.
5, pl. 14.
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land in which the tenants of D., of which he was one, were entitled
to common; that it was each year flooded with water, and he made
a ditch to avoid the water. The principal question discussed was
whether a commoner has sufficient estate to justify such an act. In
the course of the argument Brudnel said: "If I have an acre adjoining your acre, and my acre is flooded, I may make a ditch for the
water to escape, and though this floods your acre I shall not be
punished; for it is lawful for me to make this ditch in my own land;
and the water is an element that naturally descends; and then you
may make a ditch to avoid it, and so on till it comes. to a river or
ditch. And so it is lawful for anyone who has an interest in any
land to avoid the water and all other things that do him'damage."' 6
From these cases it would seem that the English doctrine was
even broader than the civil law rule; for one burdened with surface
water had not only a right of action against anyone below for
stopping the flow, but he might increase and accelerate the flow with
impunity for his own relief, though it caused injury to his neighbor
below, which the civil law rule does not permit.
So far as I have been able to ascertain, the question in America
first came before a court of last resort in A. D. "1812 in Louisiana,
where the civil law always prevailed. In the first case the right
of the upper owner to unobstructed natural drainage had been
asserted according to the civil law, 17 but it would seem that the

question was first squarely presented in Martin v. Jett (1838),1 s in
which the plaintiff sued for damages, alleging that the defendant
illegally erected a dam on his own land adjoining the plaintiff's,
whereby the natural flow of the water was obstructed and plaintiff's
land flooded, to his injury. The court reviewed the Louisiana Code,
the Code Napoleon, and the civil law texts, and held that defendant
was liable. This decision was followed in other cases on the same
question shortly afterward coming before the same court.' 9
It is believed that the question next arose in Pennsylvania in Bentz
v. Armstrong (1844),20 already cited and quoted at length, 21 in
which the natural right of flowage was recognized without question,
1
17

Yearbook, 12 Hen. VIII., p. 2.
Orleans Navigation Co. v. Mayor of New Orleans (1812),

2

Martin (La.)

215,

232.

12 La. so1, 32 Am.Dec. 120.
18
2PLattimore v. Davis (1839), 14 La. x61, 33 Am. Dec. 581, holding defendant liable
for concentrating all the water of his plantation augmenting the flow and casting it onto
plaintiff's land at one point, but the servitude on the lower estate to receive the natural
flow is affirmed; Hays v. Hays (1841), 59 La. 351, holding the lower proprietor liable
in damages and decreeing that he remove the obstructions by him placed in the drains.
208 Watts & S. 40, 42 Am. Dee&265.
2 Ante p. 449.
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but was held not applicable to the facts of the particular case of city

property.
The next court to consider the question was in Massachusetts. In
Luther v. Winnisimmet Co. (1851)22 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant obstructed an ancient water-course running through the
land of both parties: the defendant pleaded the general issue; and
the proof was that the plaintiff's land was low and sloped gradually
down to the defendant's land, and that in times of melting snow or
heavy rains water ran in no defined course from it onto the defendant's land, where part of it renfained stagnant in a pond and the rest
flowed on to the Mystic river and so to the sea, until the board of
health of Chelsea directed the defendant to abate the pond as a
nuisance, whereupon he filled it up and so occasioned the alleged
stoppage of water. The court directed the jury that if they found
no water-course the plaintiff could not claim a right of drainage
merely because his land was higher than the defendant's and sloped
towards it, so that surface water would naturally run in that direction. The jury found for the defendant, and, on exceptions taken,
the court, without saying more, approved the instructions and overruled the exceptions. Here is eidently the germ of the so-called
common law rule. Yet the decision seems to be correct because of
the fatal variance between the allegation and proof. When the trial
court on similar pleadings and proofs instructed the jury that they
might find for the plaintiff though there was no stream, and the jury
found for the plaintiff, exceptions were sustained on the authority
of this case, two years later, the court saying: "He had averred no
such right [to surface drainage], and if he proved it, it was an entire
variance between his allegation and proof, and established a case
different from that set out by him in his declaration, and one which
the defendants were not bound to meet. Nor was the variance by
any means immaterial. A mere right of drainage over the general
surface of the ground is very different from the right to the flow of
' 23
From the last remark one might very natura stream or brook.
a common law "right of drainage over the
is
there
that
infer
ally
general surface of the ground"; and perhaps the plaintiff acted on
this assumption -inbringing the action of Pwrks v. Newburyport
(1857) .2 In that case it was alleged that there was a passage way
for water over defendant's land, which he had a right to have kept
open, and which the defendant had closed, to his damage. The
proofs were that Newburyport owned a lot on which it had a schoolMass. (9 Cush.) x1z.
65 Mass. (zi
23Ashley v. Wolcott (853),
24Parks v. Newburyport (1857), 76 Mass.
263

Cush.) x9z.
(zo Gray) 28.
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house; that Parks owned the adjoining lot; that surface water had
been accustomed to flow over the school-house lot from the rear in
times of high water; that the city built an engine-house on the
school-house lot on the .side next to the Parks lot, and used the dirt
from the foundation to shore up the wall and fill the lot; and that
when the next heavy rain came the filling prevented it from running
off as it had done before, and caused it to flow over Parks's lot. The
defendant contended that the plaintiff had proved no cause of action;
but the trial court instructed the jury, that if, for a period of twenty
years prior to the act complained of, the water accumulating on the
land in the rear of the lots in question had been accustomed to find
an outlet over the land of the defendant, who had since obstructed
it, occasioning substantial injury to the plaintiff by turning the water
onto his lot, the defendant was liable. Observe that the instruction
places the right on the ground of prescription. The jury found for
the plaintiff, and the defendant excepted. The following is the
entire opinion of the court, Per Curiam: "The declaration is for
obstructing a water-course, and the instruction allowed the jury to
find for the plaintiff, although there was no water-course. No action
lies for the interruption of mere surface drainage. Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 9 Cush. I7i; Ashley v. Wolcott, ii Cush. 192.
Exceptions sustained." Here then we have for the first time a
positive assertion of the new heresy destined soon to gain repute as
the common law rule.
Strangely enough the question was considered for the first time by
the courts of last resort in three different states only the year before,
namely, New Jetsey, Missouri, and Virginia, and in each of these
courts the true common law and civil law rule, always before unques5
tioned, was approved and applied.
5
JNcu' Jersey: On bill for injunction to restrain defendant from permitting a certain brook or creek over the lots of both parties in Elizabeth City to remain obstructed
there
on defendant's lot so as to flood complainant's lot, the defendant denied that
was any brook, answering that the natural face of the ground is such that in heavy
the
rains the water naturally flows from complainant's across defendant's lot. On
pleadings and proof taken the court decreed that the defendant remove the obstruction, saying: "The answer does not deny the material allegations of the bill, that the
The defendants put
water has flowed in this same course from time immemorial.
themselves upon the ground that, while this is the natural outlet for the water, the
complainant in her bill has wrongfully dignified it with the appellation of a stream or
natural water-course. The answer calls it a ditch, and an affidavit, in the answer says
that the said channel is not a water-course, but merely an upland drain, and yet the
answer does not say that it is an artificial ditch, but expressly affirms that it was made
If, as far back as the
by the water received from the complainant's land. * *
memory of man runs, that flow of water produced a natural channel through the
defendant's land where such accumulated surplus water has always been accustomed to
run, the right of the complainant to have the water discharged in the same channel for
the relief of her land is so clear that a court of equity would not refuse to protect her
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The Massachusetts rule being thus promulgated, was reiterated
two years later in Flagg v. Worcester (859) ,26 in which the city
was sued for laying out and grading a street without providing a
culvert across it, so as to permit the escape of the surface Water as
it had before flowed, and setting it back onto the plaintiff's lot. It
was alleged that a water-course had been stopped. It was found
that there was no water-course; but in addition the court said the
city, like any other owner, might build on its land as it would, and
was not liable for obstructing the flow of mere'surface water. Four
years later a similar opinion was expressed on a like case in Dickinson v. Worcester (1863) ;27 and the same year, ,on the authority of
the Massachusetts cases, the doctrine was approved in the state of
Maine, in Bangor v. Lansil (1863) ;21 and two years later it was
approved by the New Jersey Supreme Court in denying damages
caused by building a stable in a depression so as to set back onto
plaintiff's land the water accustomed to flow down the ravine or
in her bill,
right from the mere consideration that the complainant, in stating her case
of her
has made use of technical terms not the most appropriate to meet the exigencies
water runcase. * * * It is insisted that in consequence of the small quantity of
water before
ning, the complainant can, at small expense, cut a drain or outlet for the
This defense
it reaches the defendant's premises, and discharge it in Jersey street.
not
admits the injury. * * * It is insisted that the law as to running water does
not. Here
apply to building lots in a city or large towns. I- cannot see why it does
of the comis a body of water which must be discharged, either over the building lot
plainant or over the building lot of the defendants. It is true, it is injurious to the
which the
lot of the defendants to have it discharged over it, but then it is a right
as
neighboring lot enjoys to have it discharged. There is a right and an obligation,
v. De Hart
between the two lots, which has been acquired by prescription." Earl
(1856), 12 New J. Eq. (a Beas.) 280, 7z Am. Dec. 385.
Missouri: It appearg that the plaintiff built on his own lot in the city, and then
sued his neighbor for the damage caused by water standing on defendant's lot to the
injury of plaintiff's house, and by the building of plaintiff's house prevented from
from
escaping in its accustomed course. The court declared that the plaintiff suffered
his own wrong, because he was bound to permit the water to flow from the higher lot
over his own, as it had always done. Laumier v. Francis (i856), 23 Mo. 181.
Virginia: Surface water had been accustomed to flow over the lot of the defendant
The city
in the city of Wheeling from the street by the natural lay of the ground.
constructed a fill and culvert in the street which discharged the water over the defendant's lot at a different point. The work was done under the superintendence of the
his
plaintiff as city street commissioner. The defendant then filled up the ravine on
lot of
lot so as to stop the mouth of the culvert and throw the water back onto the
the plaintiff where it remained stagnant. -For this tort an action on the case was brought.
The court said that in the absence of any authority clearly justifying the defendant's
act he must be held liable, and reversed the judgment of the court below for error in
charging the jury that by the unauthorized diversion of the flow the defendant was justified
in erecting any obstruction necessary to protect his own property, though the result
was to cast the water onto the land of third parties. Amick v. Tharp (a8S6), 13 Grat.
564, 67 Am. Dec. 787.
26 33 Gray (79 Mass.) 6os.
2789 Mass. (7 Allen) x9, but in this case the old culvert was stopped.
denying recovery by the city for the cost of constructing a sewer
2 5x Me. 5s,
stopped by defendant filling his lot where the water had formerly run.
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depression. 9 The same year, 1865, the case came before the Massachusett's court, which has generally been referred to since as the
leading case on the Massachusetts doctrine. The case referred to is
Gannon,v. Hargadon (I865) ,8 in which an action was held not
maintainable by one on whom defendant had cast surface water by
placing sods in the ruts in his drive on his own lot, through which
the water was running, whereby it was caused to flow onto plaintiff's
lot, onto which such water had never before flowed. In this case a
general declaration of the doctrine is made, and the point of the
prior Massachusetts decisions above referred to is declared to be
that: "The right of an owner of land to occupy and improve it in
such manner and for such purposes as he may see fit, either by
changing the surface or the erection of buildings or other structures
thereon, is not restricted or modified by the fact that -his own land
is so situated with reference to that of- adjoining owners that an
alteration in the mode of its improvement or occupation in any
portion of it will cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains
and snows falling on its surface or flowing onto it over the surface
of adjoining lots, either to stand in unusual quantities on other
adjacent lands, or pass into and over the same in greater quantities,
or in other 'directions than they were accustomed to flow." This
doctrine, in its statement and application, is inconsigtent with the
doctrine, nowhere denied and enforced in Massachusetts, that a man
is liable for casting water from his roof so that it runs onto his
neighbor's land, though the eaves do not overhang. It is believed
also to be contrary to the spirit of the common law in refusing to
arbitrate and"leaving the result to the law of force; moreover, if one
may build a dike, so may another, and he will succeed who can build
the highest one; and meanwhile the whole basin is inundated, to the
great prejudice of the common good, in order that the small lot of
one of these contestants may be relieved of the inconvenience of the
passing water. This doctrine has found acceptance in several other
state courts, in several merely because it was called the common law
doctrine, and the further history of it may be sufficiently seen hereafter in reviewing the decisions on the right to obstruct the flow of
surface water.
Rights and Remedies if Flow is Restrained
Passing now from the rise of the Massachusetts or so-called
common law rule to the present state of the law, we find that a
20Bowlsby v. Speer (86s), 3V N. J. L. (2 Vroom) 35r, 86 Am. Dec. 216.
3092 Mass. (io Allen) io6, 87 Am. Dec. 625, 2 Gray Property Cas. x68. Compare Fitzpatrick z. Velch (1899), 174 Mass. 586, 55 N. E. 178, 48 L. R. A. 278;
Borchsenius v. Chicago St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. (897), 96 Wis. 448, 71 N. IV. 884.
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number of courts that have adopted this rule 'have held that the
owner of city property might -build upon it or fill and grade it up to
improve it, without liability or regard for the injury it caused others
31
In South Carolina
by stopping the natural flow of surface water.
a railway company was held not liable to the owner of a city lot for
damages caused by the building of an embankment by the railway
company to protect its tracks from washout, thereby casting the
water back onto the plaintiff's lot; and this decision was based on
the provision in the state constitution that the common law of
England, except as modified by statute or inapplicable to local conditions, was the law of the state, and the erroneous supposition of
the court that the so-called common law¢ rule was the law in. England
No RIGHT op DRAINAGE BY NATURAL CouRsE IN CITIE.-Connectlcut: Chadeayne '.
U1

Robinson (1887), 55 Conn. 345, 3 Am. St. Rep. 55, ir Atl. 592, holding owner of town
lot not liable for building a fence obstructing the flow of surface water from the
adjoining lot.
Kansas: Bryant v. Merritt (xo), 71 Kan. 272, So Pac. 6oo, foundry lot filled
in so as to food greenhouse lot.
Kentucky: Middleborough Town Co. v. Helwig (Ky. Superior Court, 1892), 14
Ky. Law Rep. 43o. But see Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Goss (x897, not officially
reported), x9 Ky. Law R. 1926, 43 S. W. 203.
Maine: Bangor v. Lansil (1863), 51 M1Q.521, holding the city not entitled under
thd statute "to recover of defendant the cost of relaying a drain through his lot where
he had stopped the former drain by filling his lot, because there was no obligation
on his part to allow the water to continue to flow over his land; Morrison v. Bucksport
& B. Ry. Co. (877), 67 Me. 353, holding the railway company not liable for turning
surface water into plaintiff's cellar by building its roadbed through a depression with.out providing for the escape of water accustomed to flow there, though the franchise
from the village required the company to provide drainage.
Massachusetts: Parks v. Newburyport (1857), 76 Mass. (so Gray) 28, holding
there was no right of action for filling so as to stop surface water accustomed to flow
over defendant's school house lot next to plaintiff's lot in Newburyport.
New Jersey: Bowlsby v. Speer (x865), 31 N. J. L. (2 Vroom) 351, 86 Am.
Dec. 216.
New York: Barkley v. Wilcox (188x), 86 N. Y. 140, 4o Am. Rep. 59, Finch
Cases on Real Prop. 837, 2 Gray's Property Cases 174, Pattee's Cases Real P. so, noted
in 24 Alb- Law J. 453.
. North Carolina: Raleigh & A. A. L. Ry. Co. v. Wicker (1876), 74 N. Car. 2o,
road-bed embankment.
South Carolina: Edwards v. Charlotte C. & A. Ry. Co. (1893), 39 S. Car. 472, 18
S. E. 58, 39 Am. St. Rep. 746, 22 L. R. A. 246, also placing stress on the fact that
the embankment was necessary for the protection of defendant's tracks.
Texas: Gross v. Lampasas (x889), 74 Tex. 295, ii S. W. iO86, holding the city
liable for negligent construction of a ditch along a street to the injury of the plaintiff's land; though plaintiff had built a stone wall which shut out surface water flowing
down the street from crossing his land as wont, for he had a right to do so.
Wisconsin; Johnson v. Chicago St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. (x8gx), 80 Wis. 641, 50
N. W' 771, 27 Am. St. Rep. 76, 14 L. R. A. 495: But in Borchseius v. Chicago St.
P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. (1897), 96 Wis. 448, 71 N. W. 884, a railway company was held
liable for casting surface water onto another's land, the court saying that one might
prevent the surface water getting onto his land if he could, but if it got there he must
keep it, leave it undisturbed or turn it into a water course.
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or was of English origin.32 A like decision was rendered on like
facts in a Wisconsin case, in which the court said: "The doctrine
here sanctioned is that one proprietor may turn and divert the
surface water from his own land onto the land of his adjoining
neighbor, and so on. Each proprietor may thus pass on surface
'
water, and there is no remedy except in doing so." as According to
water flow on
the
to
have
this case the proprietor above has no right
any cause for
side
the
at
proprietor
the
nor
descent,
in the natural
complaint that water never before flowing to his land is artificially
and intentionally cast upon him. By such a series of dikes we would
hope to get the water passed up to the hill tops, but the further
disposition of it the jurists declaring this rule have not provided for.
The upshot of this rule is that the owner above may artificially cast
water on the owner below with impunity, and the owner below may
retaliate -by damming it back and making a pond of the land above;
and the law will refuse to intervene on the complaint of either,
leaving them to fight it out among themselves, according to the good
old rule that might makes right, and in the wager of battle God will
decide.
But a number of courts claiming to follow the so-called common
law rule refuse to follow it to its logical conclusion in such cases.
In Iowa the common law rule, so-called, prevails, and yet a bill for
injunction by the city to restrain a lot owner from filling a ravine
known as "Dry-run," through which water had been accustomed to
flow in times of flood and freshet, was sustained, and the defendant
was required to remove the obstructions from the run so that the
surface water could pass through it freely, the run being deemed a
water-course, though no water flowed in it except in time of rains.
The court said: "Where surface water has a fixed and certain course,
as a swail, though it may be narrow or broad, its flow cannot be
interrupted, to the injury of an adjoining proprietor.""'
In New Jersey the common law rule prevails, that the owner of
land has the right to shut out water and stop the flow unless it is
a water-course; but where there was a well defined course in which
32RAILWAY ROAD BEDs.-Edwards v. Charlotte C. & A. Ry. Co. (1893), 39 S. Car.
fact
472, I8 S. E. 58, 39 Am. St. Rep. 746, 22 L. R. A. 246, also placing stress on the

that the embankment was necessary for the protection of defendant's tracks.
93 Johnson v. Chicago St. P. 11. & 0.

Ry. Co. (i89z),

8o Wis. 641, -So N. W.

77r,

27 Am. St. Rep. 76, 14 L. R. A. 495. But in Borchienius v. Chicago St. P. M. & 0.
96 Wis. 448, 71 N. W. 884, a railway company was held liable for
Ry. Co. (897),
casting surface water onto another's land, the court saying that one might prevent
the surface water getting onto his land if he could, but if it got there he must keep it,
leave it undisturbed or turn it into a water course.
" MODIFIED DRAINAGE RIGHT RECOGNIZED.-City of 'Waverly v. Page, zo5 Iowa 22,
74 N. W. 968, 40 L. R. A. 465.
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water from a vast tract of country had from time immemorial been
accustomed to flow in time of rains over defendant's lot -in the city
of Elizabeth, a bill by an adjoining lot owner to enjoin the maintenance of a dam on defendant's land and require its abatemehit was
sustained, and the dam abated, because it unlawfully set the water
onto the plaintiff's lot. "There is no reason why the court should
pot exercise the power to abate as well as prevent the erection of
nuisances." 85
In Texas, where the common law rule also prevails, it- was held
that when an owner of'a lot in the city of Victoria filled up a natural
depression through his lot, in which surface water had always been
accustomed to flow, and caused such water to flow over the higher
lot of his neighbor, such neighbor was entitled to recover from him
the damages thereby caused, though no action would lie for diversion
of mere surface water not running in a definite channel. Grainann
v. Eicholtz (1904) .S
In New Hampshire a peculiar rule prevails, half-way between the
so-called common law rule and the civil law rule; and there a bill in
equity by the city against a lot owner to enjoin him from filling a
natural depression in his lot thr6ugh which water from the st:eet
had been accustomed to flow, was sustained, on the ground that the
stoppage of surface water was an unreasonable use, more injurious
37
to the neighbors and the city than it was beneficial to the defendant.
In' nearly all the cases in which the question has arisen in a court
not committed to the Massachusetts rule, it has been held that the
owner of city property who erects a dike to protect it from surface
water,s or who grades up or builds on his lot in such a way as to
9
obstruct the natural flow of surface water," is liable in damages
15Earl v. DeHart, 1z N. J. Eq. (I Beasley's Ch.) 280, 72 Am. Dec. 395, with note
as to power of equity to abate nuisance; Priest v. Maxwell, 127 Iowa 744, 104 N. W. 344.
2536 Tex. Civ. App. 309, 8x S. W. 756.
37City of Franklin v. Durgee (19ox), 7x N. Hamp. x86, 51 AtL. gi, 58 L. R. A. 112.
5
' DAMS IN CITIEs TO STOP SURFACE WATER NOT ALLOwED.-Gormley v. Sanford
(1869), 52 III. x58, in which one grading his land in the suburbs so as to obstruct the
natural drainage of a vineyard above to the injury of the owner was held liable; Earl v.
De Hart (1856), 12 N. J. Eq. 28o, 72 Am. Dec. 385, enjoining continuance of the dam.
But this decision seems to be discredited by Bowlsby v. Speer (1865), 31 N. J. L.
564, 67 Am.
[2 Vroom] 351, 86 Am. Dec. 216; Amick v. Tharp (1856), 13 Grat. (Va.)
Dec. 787, though a new city culvert had cast the water onto defendant's lot at a new
point.
so CITY LOT MAY NOT BE SO GRADED AS TO OBSTRUCT FLow.-Alabama: Central Ga. Ry.
Co. v. Keyton (i9o6; Ala.), 41 So. 9z8, city lot flooded by road bed, with inadequate
culvert; Shahan v. Alabama G. S. R. Co. (1897), xi5 Ala. 1S, 22 So. 449, 67 Am. St.
Rep. 2o, holding it no answer to an action for damages in setting back surface water, so
as to flood the plaintiff's store, that the road-bed and inadequate bulverts which caused
the flood had been maintained for the statutory period, since it is not alleged that injury
or cause for complaint by plaintiff had existed for that time; but if the spur track
stopping the water was built for plaintiff's use at his request, query.
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for any injury to other property on which the water is thereby set
back, and may be enjoined to abate the obstruction as a nuisance.
In other words, the right of the urban proprietor to obstruct the
flow of surface water extends only to cases in which provision for
'disposition of it has been made by public drains and sewers, so that
the obstruction will not cause injury to another; and to that extent
obstruction and diversion would or-should equally be permitted in
the country.
Notwithstanding the rule that municipal corporations are not liable
for consequential damages resulting from authorized acts, and therefore are not liable for damages resulting from grading the streets
of the city, it has been held, even by courts asserting the right of
urban land owners to make improvements obstructing the flow of
In Hall v. Rising (zpo5), 141 Ala. 431, 37 So. 586, 'an action for damages for filjing
a city lot so as to obstruct the flow of a drain was held not maintainable, and the court
said there was no proof that the filling had stopped the drain, but added that the right
to flowage of surface water had no application to cities.
Connecticut: In Adams v. 'Walker, 35 Conn. 466, 91 Am. Dec. 742, in an action for
damages for turning surface water onto the plaintiff's city lot, by defendant grading his
lot to prevent the water running into his well, it was held that plaintiff was entitled to
judgment for damages, and that it was no excuse that the purpose was to improve in
good faith the lot of the defendant.
Georgia: Mayor of Albany v. Sikes 0-894), 94 Ga. 30, 20 S. E. 257, 47 Am. St. Rep.
132, 26 L. R. A. .653, holding that the city is liable for the injury caused by surface
water obstructed by erecting the city water-works; Farkas v. Towns (1897), 103 Ga. iso,
29 S. E. 700, holding lot owner liable for building on it so as to set surface water back
on lot above though building the house increased the market value of the lot; Edgar v.
Walker (1899), zo6 Ga. 454, 32 S. E. 582, holding lot owner not i.able for flooaing due
to negligence of himself and plaintiff.
Kentucky: Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Gross (1897, not officially reported), ig Ky.
Law R. z926, 43 S. V. 203, holding that defendant railway company was liable for
damages from surface water set back into plaintiff's store by a track built in the alley by
defendant, but that the measure of damages was the present cost of providing drainage,
not the cost of raising the store or filling in the lot to the grade of the track in the alley.
Ohio: Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Ahr (1873), 2 Cincinnati Supr. Ct. Reporter
504, 13 Ohio Dec. Reprint 1o35, awarding damages for allowing embankment to form
where stone was loaded on the cars, whereby flow of surface water was obstructed.
Missouri: Laumier v. Francis (C8s6), 23 Mo. 18i, denying recovery to plaintiff for
injury caused by his building on his city lot in such a way as to hold surface water onto
defendant's lot.
Pennsylvania: Keating v. Pittston (1897), 8 Kulp (Pa.) 421, holding that the right
of a landowner to fill up his lot for building purposes is subservient to the neighbor's
right of natural drainage, and can be exercised only by making provision for the water.
Tennessee: Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Mossman (1891), 9o Tenn. z57, x6 S. W. 64,
25 Am. St. Rep. 67o, holding the Ry. Co. not liable by its backing up surface water by
its road-bed, because the bed had been maintained without suit or interruption till a right
had accrued by prescription to maintain it; Carland v. Aurin (1899), 103 Tenn. 555, 53
S. W. 940, 76 Am. St. Rep. 699, 48 L R. A. 862, sustaining an action for damages by
an owner of a city lot against the owner of the lower lot for filling it in such a way
as to set the surface water hack on plaintiff's lot.
West Virginia: Henry v. Ohio R. R. Co. (1895), 40 WV. Va. 234, 2! S. E. 863,
action for building railway road-bed so as to stop water flowing to city sewer and so
- flooding plaintiff's lot.
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surface waters, that the city wotld be liable to the abutting owner
for obstructing the flow of surface water in a ravine or natural
depression where it usually flows in times of rains and floods, by
raising the grade of the street without providing adequate outlets
for the water.40 "
In affirming a judgment for damages against a city, resulting
from inadequate provision for carrying off water stopped in a draw
by grading up a street, the Nebraska supreme court said: "It [the
city] had the undoubted right to fill the ditch therein and to dike or
dam the draw that emptied into said ditch. In other words, it had
'the right to talce such steps and perform such acts as in its judgment
were~necessary to protect its streets from surface waters; but while
it had this right, it was charged with the duty of exercising it with
ordinary care. It knew and was bound to know that the draw was
the natural conduit from which the surface waters from a large area
of surroundipg country were wont to find their way to the Blue river,
and when it diked this draw at Court sfreet and filled up the ditch
in said street it was charged with the duty of constructing sufficient
ditches and outlets to tarry the surface waters coming down said
the liability of the
draw." 4 ' Where the rule of the civil law prevails
42
in Massachusetts
But
clear.
be
to
seem
would
city in such cases
in
40Los Angeles'Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles (1894), 103 Cal. 46!, 37 Pac. 375,had
ground that provision
which judgment for the defendant city was affirmed on the
could anticipate at the
been made for escape of all the water in any flood that the city
74, 66 N. W. 996,
time of making the culvert; Kearney v. Themanson (x896), 48 Neb.
he must so use it as not'
on the ground that though one may do as he will with his own
without making a culvert
to injure others, and so the city was liable for filling the street
for the escape of the surface water.
" City of Beatrice v. Leary, 45 Neb. 149, x56, 63 N. W. 370, 5o Am. St. Rep. 546.
v. McFarland (z893), ox
0 CiTi LiAnLz FOR OBsTRucTiNG FLow.-Alabama: Avondale
water back
Ala. 381, r3 So. 504, holding the city liable for damages in setting surface
culvert, though
on lots below street grade by building the road-bed of the street without
lots.
the only way out for the water at the other side was over other private
providing
Georgia: Maguire v. Carterville (x885), 78 Ga. 84, building street without
against
culverts for escape of water stopped h'y making the street, held to give action
the city.
injury to a
Illinois: Nevins v. Peoria 0866), 41 III. 502, holding the city liable for
of the
grade
the
raising
by
lot
plaintiff's
on
cast
necessarily
imud
of
stream
lot by a
street.
Kentucky: Kemper v. Louisville (1878), r4 Bush (Ky.) 87, reversing judgment for
escape
the city in an action for damages for making a new street without culvert for the
of water that had been used to escape through a depression at that point.
Louisiana: Bowman v. New Orleans (875), 27 La. Ann. 5ox.
a
Michigan: Rice v. Mayor of Flint (1887), 67 Mich. 4or, 34 N. W. 719, affirming
not
judgment 'against the city for damages for so grading the street that water could
Huron
flow down the gutter and- flowed off over plaintiff's lot, following Ashley v. Port
(1875), 35 Mich. 296, 2o Am. Rep. 629.
Ohio: Rhodes v. Cleveland (1840), io Ohio i59, earth washed away by water from
the street.
134 Pa. St. 12, i9 AtL 437.
Pennsylvania: Haus v- Bethlehem (890),
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it has been held that the city is not liable for injury to land along a
street by surface water diverted onto it or obstructed by the making
of streets without provision for the escape of the surface water
through ravines where it had been accustomed to run..5 And this
rule has been followed in New York and Wisconsin.' To the extent
of permitting the city to obstruct the drainage, the same rule has
been adopted in a few other states. 45
Rights and Remedies if Water is Cast Upon One's Land
From the Massachusetts rule another vicious doctrine has grown,
which is usually expressed in the statement that surface water is a
common enemy which every man may lawfully rid himself of as best
he can, without regard to the injury it may cause others.' 6 This
Rhode Island: Johnson v. AWhite, city treasurer (1904), 26 R. I. 207, 58 AtL 658, 65
L. R. A. 250.
Virginia: Smith v. Alexandria (z88o), 33 Gratt. (Va.), 2o8, reversing a judgment for
defendant in an action for damages for filling the street so that water formerly carried
off in the gutters was thrown back on the lot.
United States: Arn v. Kansas City (x882), 14 Fed. Rep. 236.
3CITY Nor LIABLE.-Flagg V. Worcester (18S9), 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 6o.
4 Lynch %,. Mayor, etc., of New York (1879), 76 N. Y. 6o, 32 Am. Rep. 271, and
though the street was so graded as to prevent water escaping 'as before and cast more
water there, the action was held not maintainable; Hoyt v. Hudson (1871), 27 Wis.
6s6, 9 Am. Rep. 473, followed in Harp v. Baraboo (1898), 101 Wis. 368, 77 N. W. 744;
Waters v. Bay View (1884), 61 Wis. 642, 21 N. W. 811; Allen v. Chippewa Falls (1881),
52 Wis. 431, 9 N. W. 284, though the sewer brought water from elsewhere onto plaintiff's land. But see Pettigrew v. Evansville (1870), 25 Wis. 223, 3 Am. Rep. 5o.
"I.ampe v. San Francisco (1899), 124 Cal. 546, 57 Pac. 46!, holding city not liable
for confining surface-water on a lot below grade of the street by filling in the street;
BEATTY, C. J., dissenting; O'Brien v. St. Paul (1878), 25 Minn. 331, 33 Am. Rep. 470.
The city having raised the grade of the street so as to prevent the escape of surface
water from the lot and provided no culvert or gutter to drain it away, was held not
liable for these acts; but the judgment against the city was affirmed because of the wrong
of the city in constructing gutters which collected surface water which would not otherwise come that way and casting onto the plaintiff's lot. Pie v. Mankato (1887), 36
Minn. 383, 3 N. V. 863.
Therefore the city, though not liable to the owner above for obstructing the flow of
the surface water, was held liable to the owner at the side on whose land the obstruction
or inadequate culvert cast and diverted the water. M'Clure v. Red Wing (188r), 28
Minn. x86, 9 N. V. 767.
"ComMoN
ENEMY DoCTaRNE.-Gannon v. Hargadon, The Leading Case (x865), 92
Mass. (so Allen) io6, 87 Am. Dec. 625, in which defendant turned surface water away
from his land onto plaintiff by putting sods in the ruts in defendant's driveway, where
the water was running; Bryant

'. Merritt

(1905),

7x Kan. 272, 8o Pac. 6oo, holding

defendants not liable for filling in his foundry lot so as to turn surface water onto
plaintiff's lot and ruining her greenhouse; Werner v. Popp (1905), '94 Minn. X18, 521,
2o2 N. AV. 366, 103 N.
V. 164.
Limitation on Doctrine.-But in a late case the Massachusetts rule is somewhat
abridged by a decision holding the city liable for casting surface water on plaintiff's
property at a point where it was liable to accumulate for want of adequate means of
escape, the change in course being unreasonable and unnecessary. Daley v. Watertown
(2906), 192 Mass. zx6, 78 N. E. 143.
This limitation seems to have obtained generally wherever the Massachusetts doctrine
is recognized. Sheehan v. Flynn (2894), 59 Minn. 436, 61 N. W. 462, 26 L. R. A. 632;
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heresy finds no sanction in the civil law, by which the proprietor
above was entitled to the natural flow of surface water for his relief,
but could do nothing to aggravate the burden on the proprietor
3
below ;47 and such is the law now in the .states generally,' and in
Todd'v. York County (1904), 72 Neb. 207, xoo N. W. 299; Sullivan v. Browning (1904),
37 N. J. Eq. 391, s8 At. 302; Nicolai v. Wilkins (1894), 104 Wis. 580, 8o N. W. 939;
Borchsenius v. Chicago St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. (1897), 96 Wis. 448, 71 N. W. 884;
Pettigrew v. Evansville (187o), 25 Wis. 233, 3 Am. Rep. 5o, enjoining construction of
ditches to throw water onto plaintiff's land.
4T Domat" Civil Law (Cushing's Ed.), p. 616, § 1583; Ulpian D. 39, 3, 31; Ware's
Roman Water Law, § zo.
4
1NATURAL FLow CANNOT BE INcREAsF-.-United States: Am v. Kansas City (1882),
14 Fed. Rep. 236, city land.
Alabama: Crabtree v. Baker (1883), 75 Ala. 91, 94, 51 Am. Rep. 424, country land.
146 Cal. 317, 8o Pac. 92.
California: Wood v. Moulton (905),
Chairman v. Queen Anne's R. Co. (r9oi), 3 Pennewill (Del.) 407, 54
Delaware:
AtI. 687.
District of Columbia: Frisbie v. Cowen (i9oz), 18 App. D. C. 381, that a-railway
company is liable for emptying ditches along its tracks into a gully.
Illinois: Nevius a. Peoria (1866), 41 II. 5oa, city land; Hicks v. Silliman (1879),
92 Ill. 255, country land.
Indian Territory: Kansas City P. & G. Ry. Co. v. Williams (19oo), 3 Ind. Ter. 352,
8
5 S. W. 570.
Indiana: PItoka Tp. v. Hopkins (189i), 131 Ind. 142, 3o N. E. 896, 31 Am. St. Rep.
417, enjoining town ditch ?s a nuisance; Temipleton v. Voshloe (i88o), 72 Ind. 134, 37 Am.
Rep. i5o; New Albany v. Lines (1898), 21 Ind. App. 380, 51 N. E. 346, holding city
liable for casting water from street onto adjoining lot; Thornton v. Frigate (1899), 21
Ind. App: 537, 52 N. E. 763, same.
Iowa: Wirds v. VierKandt (i9o6), 131 Iowa 125, xo8 N. W. io8, but declaring that
the court favors a liberal policy to redeem wet lands by drainage where it can be done
without substantial injury.
Kentu'cky: Bonte v. Postell (igoo), 22 Ky. Law. Rep. 583, 58 S. ,V. 536, 5
L. R. A. 187, seepage from sewer.
32 Am. Dec. rzo, country land;
Louisiana: Martin v. Jett (1838), 12 La. 5o,
Barrow v. Landry (i86o), 15 L.a. Ann. 681, 77 Am. Dec. 199, though 'seemingly' beneficial to the owner below.
chigan: Cranson a. Snyder (1904), 137 Mich. 6xo, ioo N. W. 674; Yerex v.
.
4
Eineder (i89i), 86 Mich. 24, 48 N. W. 875, 24 Am. St. Rep. 113, though merely draining in the natural direction to reclaim his land; Horton v. Sullivan (1893), 97 Mich.
282, 56 N. W. 552.
Minnesota: Pie v. Mankato (1887), 36 Minn. 383, 31 N. V. 863, city land.
Missouri: Rychlicki a. St. Louis (1889), 98 Mo. 497, xx S. W. 1001, 14 Am. St.
Rep. 651, awarding damages for land flooded by surface water diverted by defendant
grading its streets.
Nebraska: Jacobson v. Van Boening (1896), 48 Neb. 8o, 66 N. V. 993, 58 Am. St.
Rep. 684, 32 L. R. A. 229, reviewing former decisions and enjoining further maintenance of the ditch on farm land.
Neada: Boynton a. Langley (1885), ig Nev. 69, 6 Pac. 437, 3 Am. St. Rep. 781,
seepage from irrigation.
New Jersey: Miller v. Morristown (189o), 62 N. J. Eq. 62, 2o Atl. 6r.
New York: Peck v. Goodberlett (1888), 1o9 N. Y. 18o, 16 N. E.' 35o, holding defendant not liable for water running in dead furrows onto plaintiff's land somewhat faster
than it would without the furrows.
North Carolina: Parker a. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. (1898), 123 N. C. 71, 31 S. E. 381;
Porter a. Durham (1876), 74 N. C. 767, country land.
16 Ohio St. 334, 88 Am. Dec. 452, that plaintiff is
Ohio: Butler a. Peck (865),
entitled to damages for surface water cast onto his land by ditches in defendant's marsh.
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England. 49 The unsoundness of this "common enemy" doctrine is
demonstrated by the rule, as old as the common law, and nowhere
denied, that one who builds on his own land so near the line that
the drip from his eaves falling on his own ground necessarily flows
onto the land of his neighbor is liable for the injury thereby caused
to the neighbor.50 Likewise, if he paves his land so that it is
Oklahona: Davis v. Fry (1904), 14 OkL 340, 78 Fac. i8o, 69 L. R. A. 460, draining
cat-hole onto plaintiff.
Pennsylvania: Miller v. Laubach (1864), 47 Pa. St. 154, country land; Meixell v.
Morgan (x892), 149 Pa. St. 415, 24 Atl. 216, 34 Am. St. Rep. 614, holding defendant
not liable for hastening the flow by ditching.
Rhode Island: Johnson v. White (1904), 26 R. I. ao7, 58 Atl. 658, 65 L. R. A.. 250,
action against city treasurer for damages from surface water naturally flowing over
plaintiff's lot but concentrated to his damage by grading the street.
South Carolina: Brandenberg v. Zeigler (19oz), 62 S. C. 18, 39 S. E. 790, 55
L. R. A. 414, 89 Am. St. Rep. 887, that defendant is liable for emptying his ponds onto
plaintiff's land.
Tennessee: Tyrus v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co. (19o5), 114 Tenn. 579, 86
S. W. 1074.
Utah: North Point C. I. Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake C. Co. (1897), 16 Utah 246, 52
Pac. i68, 40 L. R. A. 851.
Virginia: Chalkley v. Richmond (i89i), 88 Va. 402, 14 S. E. 339, 28 Am. St. Rep.
73o, reversing judgment for the city in an action against it for damages caused by filth
escaping from a faulty sewer into plaintiffs cellar.
Washington: Noyes v. Cosselman (1902), 29 Wash. 635, 70 Pac. 6x, 92 Am. St. Rep.
937, enjoining making of a ditch all on defendant's land, t0 a point from which the
water would flow onto plaintiff's land.
West Virginia: Knight v. Brown (1885), 25 V. Va. 8o8.
4England: Hurdman v. Northeastern Ry. Co. (1878), L. R. 3 C. P. Div. x68, holding
defendant liable for so filling its land that water was caused to soak through its wall
into plaintiff's house.
Contra: Kennison v. Beverly (1888), 146 Mass. 467, 16 N. E. 2V8, holding city not
liable *for water percolating into plaintiffs cellar from a catch-basin built by the city
eight feet from plaintiff's house, and negligently allowed to become clogged.
SLiABLE FOR EAvas DRxP.-Arkansas: Chandler v. Lazarus (1892), 55 Ark. 312, xS
S. W. 18x.
California: Armstrong v. Luco (1894), 102 Cal. 672, 36 Pac. 674.
Indiana: Conner v. Woodfill (18go), x26 Ind. 85, 25 N. E. 876, 22 Am. St. Rep. 568,
water running from church water spouts eight feet to plaintiff's lot.
Kansas: Hazeltine v. Edgmand (x886), 35 Kan. 202, 10 Pac. 544, 57 Am. Rep. 1S7.
Massachusetts: Fitzpatrick v. Welch (z899), 174 Mass. 486, 48' L. R. A. 278, 55
N. E. 178.
Minnesota: Beach '. Gaylord (18go), 43 Minn. 476, 45 N. W. xops.
Michigan: Underwood v. Waldron (1876), 33 Mich. 239; Barry v. Peterson (1882),
48 Mich. 263, x2 N. W. x8r.
Bellows v. Sackett (1853), 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 96; Davis v. Niagara
New York:
Falls Tower Co. (19oa), x7 N. Y. 336, 64 N. E. 4, 89 Am. St. Rep. 817, 57 L. R. A.
545.
North Carolina: Davis v. Smith (1906), 141 N. Car. xo8, 53 S. E. 745, water and
snow from defendant's roof falling against plaintiff's house.
Pennsylvania: Gould v. McKenna (1878), 86 Pa. St. 297, 27 Am. Rep. 705.
Water Cast Into Street.-But in Jessup v. Bamford Bros. Silk Mfg. Co. (1goa), 66
N. 1. L. 641, Sz Atl. 147, 88 Am. St. Rep. 5o2, 58 L. R. A. 329, defendant was held
not liable for building near the street and piping the water from the upper part of its
lot to the street where it would naturally flow, and casing it through the wall of its
building onto the sidewalk in one place where it froze and caused plaintiff to fall and
be injured.
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impervious to water, turns his water pipes onto it, whence the water
in a heavy rain runs into his privy vaults, and, for want of adequate
exit, thence overflows into plaintiff's cellar to his injury, an action
lies.""
Even a city, though empowered by law to fix street grades, and
by the circumstances often bound to raise the grade, is generally
held5 2liable if water from the street is thereby cast on the adjoining
lots.

It has also been held that one whose lot is below the grade of the
street has no remedy against the city nor the owner of the adjoining
lot for damages from water caused to flow onto it by improvement
of the adjoining lot or street at the proper grade.58 Where the
street is below the adjoining lots and the earth on the lots is washed
away by water turned into the street by the city, it has been held
liable for the damages. 54
But clearly the owner of*a city lot is not liable to an action for
damages resulting from his permitting the water to run off his'lot
onto that of his neighbor by the natural course of descent;55
51Jette v. Hughes (1876),

67 N. Y. 267:
NToTs.-Nevins v. Peoria (1866), 41 II. 502;
OR CASTING WArER 0nro
Rice v. Mayor of Flint (887), 67 Mich. 401, 34 N. V. 719; McClure v. Red Wing
(i88x), 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767; Pie v. Mankato (1887), 36 Minn. 383, 31 N. W. 863.
Contra: 'Lynch v. Mayor, etc., of New York (1879), 76 N. Y. 6o, 32 Am. Rep. 27I;
Flagg v. Worcester (1859), 79 Mass. (13 Gray), 6ox; Allen v. Chippewa Falls (s88z), 52
Wis. 431, 9 N. W. 284.
Collecting surface water by the city into a ditch into which it was not accustomed to
flow was enjoined at the suit of the owner of land through which the ditch flowed.
Soule v. Passaic (1890), 47 N. J. Eq. 28, 2o Atl. 346; Miller v. Morristown (890), 47
N. J. Eq. 62, 2o Atl. 61; West Orange v. Field (1883), 37 N. J. Eq. 6oo, 45 Am. Rep.
670; Field v. West Orange (1885, N. 3. Ch., not officially reported), 2 Atl. 236.
53Phillips v. Waterhouse (x886), 69 Iowa 199, N. W. 539, 58 Am. Rep. 22o, holding
the owner of a city lot not liable for injury to a house below the grade of the street
caused by water cast from defendant's house into the alley at grade and flowing thence
16o feet to plaintiff's lot; Freberg v. Davenport (1884), 63 Iowa 119, 18 N. W. 705,
holding a city not liable for surface water flowing from the street onto lots below grade,
though caused by grading the street and sufficient culverts and gutters might have been
provided to prevent it.
" Podhaisky v. Cedar Rapids (1878), io6 Iowa 543, 76 N. W. 847; Rhodes v. Cleveland (1840), 1o Ohio, x59.
5 Phillips v. Waterhouse (1886), 69 Iowa 199, 28 N. W. 539, S8 Am. Rep. 220, the
water running from the waterspout at the rear of defendant's house into the alley, and
thence 16o feet to defendant's house, which was below the street grade; Livezey v.
Schmidt (z896), 96 Ky. 441, 29 S. W. 25, alleging that water fouled by defendant's
stable escaped into plaintiff's cellar; Morrill v. Hurley (1876), 120 Mass. 99; Vanderwiele v. Taylor (1875), 65 N. Y. 341, in which plaintiff asked damages for injury to the
wall of his house by water naturally flowing down the hill over and from defendant's
lot and unaffected by any act of his; Sowers v. Lowe (1887, Pa., not officially reported),
9 Atl. 44, though the water came from defendant's eaves-trough spouts at the back end
of the lot, on the side next to plaintiff's house, and thence ran against plaintiff's cellar
wall to his injury; Sentner v. Tees (89R), 132 Pa. St. 216, 18 At. 1114, water running
from defendant's lot lying below grade, which he could drain at small expense.
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a fortiori, for damages from plaintiff damming the water back onto
defendant's lot;56 and injunction against the upper proprietor to
restrain continued flowing of water onto the lower lot has been7
denied except in so far as the flow was increased by artificial means .
Yet injunction will be granted to restrain even the natural flow of
surface water fouled on defendant's premises.5 8 The plaintiff having
wilfully and persistently fouled the surface water naturally flowing
from his lot onto the defendant's lot, it was very justly held that
defendant did no wrong in obstructing its flow onto his land, and
was not obliged to go to law for redress.5 9 Or if the proprietor above
wrongfully augments the flow, the owner below may rightfully
stop it.6° This, however, would be no excuse for turning it onto
another. 61 That surface water collected and standing on plaintiff's
lot was endangering the foundation of defendant's house, who
had offered to pay for the expense of removing it, was held to be
for entering and digging in
no defense to an action of trespass
62
plaintiff's lot to remove the water.
JOHN R. ROOD.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
" Laumier v. Francis (1856), 23 MO. 181.
'I Goldsmith v. Elsas (1874), 53 Ga. x86.
i Gawtry v. Leland 0s879), 31 N. J. Eq. (4 Stew.) 385. Or damages might be
recovered. Livezey v. Schmidt (489S), 96 Ky. 44x, 29 S. W. 25.
89Beard v. Murphy (1864), 37 Vt. 99, 86 Am. Dec. 693.
But in Virginia it was held that diversion of the water naturally flowing over defendant's lot to a new point, by street improvements constructed under the direction of the
plaintiff as street commissioner was no justification for so obstruucting the flow as to
cast the water onto the plaintiff's lot. Amick v. Tharp (1856), x3 Grat. 564, 67 Am.
Dec. 787.
m Mayor of Sweetwater v. Pate (Tenn. Ch. 1goo), 59 S. W. 48o, denying injunction
to prevent stoppage; Matteson v. Tucker (r9o6), x31 Iowa Six, 107 N. W. 6oo, denying
damages for stoppage; Priest v. Maxwell (1905), x27 Iowa 744, 104 N. W. 344, allowing
injunction though complainant built counter-dike. Cedar Falls v. Hansen (1897), 104
Iowa 189, 73 N. V. 58s, denying injunction to restrain filling city lot to grade; Horton
v'. Sullivan (1893), 97 Mich. 282, 56 N. NV. 552, saying that damages would not be
recoverable for stoppage in such a case. But see Sharpe v. Scheihle (1894), z62 Pa.
St. 34!, 29 Atl. 736, 42 Am. St. Rep. 838, awarding damages as to stopping water
entitled to flow there.
61Amick v. Tharp (1856), 13 Grat. (Va.) 564, 67 Am. Dec. 787, holding a lot owner
in a city liable to his neighbor for diverting onto him water wrongfully cast onto defendant's lot by the city sewer.
C2 Grant v. Allen (1874), 41 Conn. i56.

